University of Wisconsin Milwaukee

UWM Digital Commons
Theses and Dissertations

May 2013

Second Nature in Kant's Theory of Artistic
Creativity
Adam Blazej
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee

Follow this and additional works at: https://dc.uwm.edu/etd
Part of the Philosophy Commons
Recommended Citation
Blazej, Adam, "Second Nature in Kant's Theory of Artistic Creativity" (2013). Theses and Dissertations. 79.
https://dc.uwm.edu/etd/79

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by UWM Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an
authorized administrator of UWM Digital Commons. For more information, please contact open-access@uwm.edu.

SECOND NATURE IN KANT’S THEORY OF ARTISTIC CREATIVITY

by
Adam Blazej

A Thesis Submitted in
Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements of the Degree of

Master of Arts
In Philosophy

at
The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee
May 2013

ABSTRACT
SECOND NATURE IN KANT’S THEORY OF ARTISTIC CREATIVITY
by
Adam Blazej

The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2013
Under the Supervision of Professor William Bristow

One of the central claims of John McDowell’s Mind and World is that, in reconciling an
apparent opposition between the normative and the natural, philosophers should look to a
notion of second nature: the idea that nature includes a species of animals (namely,
human beings) who, through their socialization, transform themselves into rational beings
capable of thinking about and acting in the world in response to reasons. McDowell
argues that Kant lacks a notion of second nature and thereby fails to overcome the
relevant problem of reconciliation. My aim in this paper is to show that (pace McDowell)
Kant does possess and employ a notion of second nature in his theory of artistic
creativity. More precisely, I try to show that Kant’s conception of genius as the
expression of aesthetic ideas employs a notion of second nature that is similar to, albeit
importantly distinct from, the one to which McDowell appeals.
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1
1. Introduction
One of the central claims of John McDowell’s Mind and World is that, in
reconciling an apparent opposition between the normative and the natural, philosophers
should look to a notion of second nature: the idea that nature includes a species of
animals (namely, human beings) who, through their socialization, transform themselves
into rational beings capable of thinking about and acting in the world in response to
reasons. McDowell argues that Kant lacks a notion of second nature and thereby fails to
overcome the relevant problem of reconciliation. My aim in this paper is to show that
(pace McDowell) Kant does possess and employ a notion of second nature in his theory
of artistic creativity.
The structure of this paper is as follows. In Section 1, I clarify the dialectical
structure of McDowell’s Mind and World, focusing especially on his naturalism of
second nature. In Section 3, I argue that Kant’s theory of artistic creativity offers a
conception of human action that undermines an assumption that causes McDowell to
overlook Kant’s notion of second nature. The assumption is that intentional actions are
normatively governed solely in virtue of their conceptual content. Kant’s conception of
genius as the expression of aesthetic ideas, I argue, shows how actions can be
normatively governed independently of their conceptual content. In Section 4, then, I go
on to show how that conception of genius employs a notion of second nature that is
similar to, albeit importantly distinct from, the one to which McDowell appeals. In
Section 5, I conclude with some brief remarks on the relevance of this distinctive notion
of second nature for the problem of reconciling the normative and the natural.

2
2. McDowell’s exorcism
McDowell’s chief aim in Mind and World is to ‘exorcise’ what he takes to be a
distinctively modern philosophical problem regarding the possibility of normatively
governed thought and action. I begin in this section by identifying that problem. Then, I
clarify certain key features of the notion of second nature to which McDowell appeals in
his response to that problem. Lastly, I summarize McDowell’s claim that Kant lacks a
notion of second nature and thereby fails to overcome the relevant philosophical problem.
2.1
According to McDowell, the philosophical ‘anxiety’ that he seeks to exorcise
arises from two opposing tendencies in the modern tradition. On the one hand, there is a
tendency to regard thought as spontaneous, or responsive to reasons, as “answerable to
the empirical world.”1 On the other hand, there is a tendency to regard experience as
receptive, “made up of impressions, impingements by the world on a possessor of
sensory capacities.”2 Such impingements are causal events in nature and, therefore,
describable in terms of scientific laws of nature. For McDowell, the idea that these mere
impingements can make thought answerable to the empirical world is nothing more than
a myth: the Myth of the Given. But the opposing idea of coherentism, according to which
judgments are not answerable to anything independent of spontaneity, is dissatisfying, as
well. For, in that case, thought is no more than “a frictionless spinning in a void.”3 Thus,
we are faced with a familiar kind of philosophical problem: how is thought about the
world possible?

1

McDowell (1996: xii).
Ibid., xv.
3
Ibid., 11.
2

3
In order to overcome an intolerable oscillation between various versions of the
Myth of the Given and coherentism, McDowell believes that we must recognize that
experience requires the integration of spontaneity and receptivity, or concepts and
intuitions. This insight is thought to be expressed by Kant’s famous remark in the
Critique of Pure Reason: “[T]houghts without content are empty, intuitions without
concepts are blind” (A51/B76).4 Guided by this Kantian insight, we are said to avoid the
Myth of the Given, for the reason that the impacts by the world on our senses to which
our thoughts are answerable are to be understood not as mere impingements but as
always already possessing conceptual content. We are also said to avoid coherentism, for
the reason that those impacts belong to receptivity rather than a wholly independent
variety of spontaneity. That is to say, we perceive our sense experiences as appearances
that things are thus and so. Yet, McDowell does not stop here. Rather, he goes on to ask
why this insight has been hitherto overlooked by the modern philosophical tradition.
McDowell’s ‘diagnosis’, then, of the anxiety in question points to the
‘disenchantment’ of nature following the rise of modern science in the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries. During that time, nature became identified with the ‘realm of law’
and thereby wholly independent of the ‘space of reasons’, or the normative relations
constituted by conceptual thought. Given this conception of nature and a commitment to
naturalism – the view that nature is all there is – McDowell believes that we are
confronted with the seeming impossibility of adequately accounting for the possibility of
not only normatively governed thought but also action. For, according to McDowell,
Kant’s crucial insight about human cognition applies just as well to human action:

4

All references to Kant’s works are given by volume and page number of the Akademie edition, except in
the case of references to Kant’s first Critique, which are given by A-edition/B-edition paginations.

4
“[I]ntentions without overt activity are idle, and movements of limbs without concepts
are mere happenings, not expressions of agency.”5 Thus, in the grips of the restrictive
conception of nature due to modern science, we are faced, yet again, with a distinctively
philosophical problem: how could we think about and act in the world in response to
reasons, given that we are the natural beings that we are?
McDowell insists that we avoid two traditional strategies taken in response to this
problem. We should avoid, on the one hand, ‘bald naturalism’, which attempts to reduce
the ‘space of reasons’ to the ‘realm of law’, for the reason that that task, according to
McDowell, is doomed to fail. The supposed problem is that this form of naturalism leaves
nature ‘disenchanted’; hence, normativity as an irreducible feature of human experience
is excluded from the bald naturalist’s conception of nature. On the other hand, we should
also avoid ‘rampant platonism’, which conceives of the ‘space of reasons’ as
ontologically transcendent and separate from nature, for the reason that that position
comes at the cost of supernaturalism, making it impossible to account for the possibility
of normatively governed thoughts and actions as natural phenomena. McDowell believes,
however, that, so long as philosophy is under the spell of the conception of nature
inspired by modern science, bald naturalism and rampant platonism will appear to be the
only options.
2.2
Hence, McDowell claims that, in reconciling the apparent opposition of the
normative and the natural, philosophers should look to a notion of second nature: the idea
that nature includes a species of animals (namely, human beings) who, through their
socialization, transform themselves into rational beings capable of thinking about and
5

McDowell (1996: 89).

5
acting in the world in response to reasons. According to McDowell, Aristotle’s
conception of practical wisdom, which is the faculty responsible for our responsiveness
to ethical reasons, exemplifies this less restrictive conception of nature. Here are what I
take to be the key features of that conception and, so, McDowell’s naturalism of second
nature.
One is that practical wisdom becomes second nature to us as the result of a wholly
natural process, namely, socialization into a human community. According to
McDowell’s Aristotle, we are alerted to ethical demands “by acquiring appropriate
conceptual capacities. When a decent upbringing initiates us into the relevant way of
thinking, our eyes are opened to the very existence of this tract of the space of reasons.”6
Put another way, we learn to respond appropriately to what is noble through, in part, the
modeling of correct behavior by our parents, relatives, peers, etc. For McDowell, this
point applies to our responsiveness to reasons in general and not just those concerning
ethics.7 So, for example, a child learns to respond appropriately to the color red through a
process of instruction that includes, perhaps, presenting her with examples of red objects
and saying the word ‘red’, adding ripe strawberries to her breakfast, helping her in
assorting her toys by color, etc. Hence, for McDowell, our responsiveness to reasons in
general becomes second nature to us through the result of socialization.
A second key feature of McDowell’s notion of second nature is that it involves
subjecting of nature to a ‘partial re-enchantment’ in which the realm of law is understood
as a part of a larger nature that also includes a sui generis form of spontaneity.8 So, even
though the process through which our capacity to be responsive to reasons becomes
6

Ibid., 82.
Ibid., 84.
8
Ibid., 88.
7
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second nature to us is wholly natural, “the structure of the space of reasons is alien to the
layout of nature conceived of as the realm of law.”9 That is to say, although the
conceptual capacities that constitute our responsiveness to reasons are natural in the sense
that they arise from our socialization into a human community, those capacities cannot be
made intelligible in terms of the elements of nature that are independent of the sui generis
spontaneous character of those capacities themselves. Those capacities that are second
nature to us are thus differentiated from those capacities that belong to us as mere
animals, i.e., our ‘first nature’.
Two more key features of McDowell’s notion of second nature are revealed by
his response to a potential worry facing his relaxed, Aristotelian naturalism: how does
that naturalism avoid the threat the rampant Platonism, given that it subjects nature to a
partial re-enchantment? Here is McDowell’s response.
[I]n Aristotle’s conception, the rational demands of ethics are not alien to
the contingencies of our life as human beings…[Those demands] are
autonomous; we are not to feel compelled to validate them from outside an
already ethical way of thinking. But this autonomy does not distance the
demands from anything specifically human, as in rampant platonism. They
are essentially within reach of human beings…Second nature could not
float free of potentialities that belong to a normal human organism. This
gives human reason enough of a foothold in the realm of law to satisfy any
proper respect for modern natural science.10
The first point to draw from this passage is that correct ethical judgment, for McDowell’s
Aristotle, is constrained by the contingencies of human life, specifically, our needs and
concerns. For instance, if our bodies had developed in such a way that we were altogether
incapable of staying afloat in the water, then it would be reckless, rather than courageous,
to dive into a deep pool of water to save a drowning child. But, as Crispin Wright points

9

Ibid., 84.
Ibid., 83-4, emphasis added.
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out, a rampant platonist need not deny this claim.11 Indeed, the dependency of the process
of becoming second nature on first nature is apparently captured by Kant’s distinction
between perfect and imperfect duties. Although our perfect duties (e.g., one must never
commit suicide from self-love) admit of “no exception in the interest of inclination”, our
imperfect duties (e.g., one must sometimes contribute to the well-being of others when
doing so does not come at a great cost) do admit of such exceptions (4:421n12). Yet,
Kant’s moral theory can arguably be regarded as a version of rampant Platonism, since,
according to that theory, human freedom is intelligible only in reference to a causality
that is independent of the sensible world.12
Of course, McDowell finds Kant’s version of rampant Platonism problematic,
and, later on, I hope to make explicit what that problem is. For the moment, however,
what is important to see is that, in order to distinguish his position from rampant
platonism, McDowell must endorse a less pedestrian claim about second nature than the
passage above suggests at first glance. Rather than just particular virtues, the general
moral principles to which we are alerted are themselves conditioned by our human
contingencies. In that case, none of our duties would be perfect in Kant’s sense, since all
of our duties would be determined, in part at least, by our sensible natures. And, again,
this point would, for McDowell, generalize beyond ethical principles to rational demands
in general, including principles of logic, presumably.13 Simply put, a third key feature of
McDowell’s naturalism is that the development of our responsiveness to reasons as

11

Wright (1996).
See, e.g., Section III of his Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals.
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Wright (1996) voices some doubts about McDowell’s application this point to logical demands,
suggesting that McDowell should limit his discussion to only ethical demands.
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second nature to us is constrained by aspects of ourselves as mere animals, i.e., our first
nature.
The second point to draw from the above passage is that correct ethical judgment,
according to McDowell, is ‘essentially within reach of human beings’ who have been
properly initiated into the ‘space of reasons’. As with the previous point, however, a
rampant platonist need not deny this claim, for, presumably, the Plato of the Republic
held that only philosophers had access to the Forms and, therefore, correct ethical
judgment. Both views face the worry that they entail an intolerable sort of elitism. And it
is not clear that restricting virtuous behavior to those who have been given a proper
upbringing is any better than restricting such behavior to philosophers. In an attempt to
assuage this charge of elitism, McDowell claims that the tradition in which one is brought
up must itself include a responsiveness to reflective scrutiny.14 And, again, McDowell’s
takes this point to apply to rational demands beyond the domain of ethics. So, a fourth
key feature of McDowell’s naturalism is that the responsiveness to reasons as second
nature is accessible to all human beings who have had a decent upbringing that has been
subjected to reflective criticism according to demands internal to that very upbringing.
A fifth, and final, key feature of McDowell’s notion of second nature is revealed
by its role in his exorcism of the relevant philosophical anxiety. Recall that, for
McDowell, we can overcome that anxiety only if we recognize, with Kant, that
experience requires the integration of concepts and intuitions, and that this insight is
preserved only through an appeal to the notion of second nature. Hence, for McDowell,
the exercise of the faculties that are second nature to us must be cognitive; that is, their
exercise must engender empirical knowledge through the subsumption of intuitions under
14

McDowell (1996: 98-9).
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concepts. So, a child comes to know e.g. that some object is red through an ordinary
process of instruction, such as the one described earlier. Responding appropriately to the
color red (e.g., perceiving an apple as red) becomes second nature for the child.
Similarly, a child comes to know that keeping one’s promises is virtuous by means of the
modeling of correct behavior by her parents, relatives, peers, etc. In both of these cases,
for McDowell, the reasons to which one is responsive are experienced directly within the
framework of our everyday experiences.
Since my aim in this paper is limited to addressing McDowell’s claim that Kant
lacks a notion of second nature, I will not consider the various objections that can be, and
have been, raised against his naturalism. For the same reason, the preceding is not meant
to provide an exhaustive analysis of the notion of second nature that McDowell borrows
from Aristotle. I only point out these features here so that, later on, I can show that the
notion of aesthetic ideas that Kant develops in his theory of artistic creativity can be
identified with a notion of second nature that is similar to (albeit importantly different
from) the one to which McDowell appeals. Before turning to that theory, however, I will
briefly explain McDowell’s criticism of Kant.
2.3
The essence of McDowell’s criticism is that Kant’s doctrine of transcendental
idealism makes the notion of second nature incoherent. Briefly stated, on the
interpretation that McDowell endorses15, that doctrine states that there is an ontological
distinction between appearances and the supersensible, and that the former are the result
of a non-empirical interaction between the latter and our sensible faculties. McDowell

15

McDowell (1996: viii) expresses his debt to P.F. Strawson’s influential interpretation of Kant’s
theoretical philosophy.
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believes that this interaction shows Kant’s purported claim that we can have objectively
valid cognition through experience to be insincere. For, “the radical mind-independence
of the supersensible comes to seem exemplary of what any genuine mind-independence
would be”, but Kant’s doctrine states that we cannot have knowledge of the
supersensible.16 Moreover, Kant’s distinction between appearances and the supersensible,
along with his view of nature as governed by mechanistic causes, accommodates the idea
of nature represented by the scientific revolution, the idea that “nature is the realm of law
and therefore devoid of meaning.”17 But that idea, for McDowell, is precisely what has
obscured the notion of second nature from philosophers for so long.
McDowell extends this criticism through a discussion of Kant’s account of the
self. According to McDowell, in order to avoid a Cartesian conception of the self, Kant
concludes that the idea of a subjective unity of consciousness must be merely formal.18
But this conclusion depends, McDowell thinks, on the mistaken assumption that “when
we provide for the content of this idea of persistence, we must confine ourselves within
the flow of ‘consciousness’.”19 The disastrous result of this assumption is that any claim
to objectively valid cognition of the subjective unity of consciousness need not have
anything to do with an embodied being. Hence, McDowell concludes that, “[i]n the
absence of a serious notion of second nature”, Kant cannot make sense of the idea of an
embodied, rational being.20 Granting this inference, I nonetheless believe that there is
reason for doubting McDowell’s claim that Kant lacks a ‘serious’ notion of second
nature. For the details of the argument in support of that claim rest largely on matters
16

Ibid., 96.
Ibid., 97.
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Ibid., 101.
19
Ibid.
20
Ibid., 103.
17
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concerning the Critique of Pure Reason.21 But Kant’s first Critique is simply the wrong
place to look for a notion of second nature. A more appropriate place to look is, rather,
the aesthetic theory that he presents in his Critique of Judgment to which I now turn.

3. Kant’s theory of artistic creativity
In the previous section, I outlined McDowell’s notion of second nature, which he
claims preserves the crucial Kantian insight that experience must be conceived
conceptual. I also mentioned that, for McDowell, that insight, which Kant expresses in
the context of human cognition, applies just as well to human action. Just as ‘intuitions
without concepts are blind,’ McDowell says that, “movements of limbs without concepts
are mere happenings, not expressions of agency.”22 Roughly stated, the Kantian insight as
it applies to agency is that intentional actions are normatively governed in virtue of their
conceptual content, which can be identified with determinate rules for acting.
My reason for making this more explicit is that I believe that McDowell’s
application of Kant’s remark about human cognition over the domain of human action is
mistaken, at least by Kant’s own lights. Moreover, I believe that this mistaken
generalization is, in part at least, what prevents McDowell from recognizing Kant’s
distinctive notion of second nature. My aim in this section, then, is to show that, for Kant,
some intentional actions are expressions of non-conceptual agency, i.e., normatively
governed independently of any concept, or determinate rule. Thus free from McDowell’s

21

Some philosophers have criticized the interpretation of Kant’s doctrine of transcendental idealism
endorsed by McDowell. See Michael Friedman (1996), Graham Bird (1996), and Henry Allison (1997).
For the purposes of this paper, I assume that McDowell’s interpretation is accurate, though I take my
eventual criticisms to be in the spirit of his other detractors.
22
McDowell (1996: 89).
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restrictive conception of action, I will be able to elucidate Kant’s notion of second nature
in the next section.
3.1
Turning to Kant in search of a defense of the possibility of intentional actions that
are normatively governed independently of concepts, or determinate rules, might seem
unpromising. Throughout his writings, he emphasizes the crucial role of concepts in
establishing the normativity of human experience. Of course, there is the oft-cited dictum
of his Critique of Pure Reason that “intuitions without concepts are blind”, which is often
understood as saying that intuitions must be ‘brought under’ concepts in order for those
representations to have meaningful content (A51/B75).23 But there is also Kant’s
assertion in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals that a rational being “act[s] in
accordance with the representation of laws, that is, in accordance with principles”
(4:412). Even in the published Introduction of the Critique of the Power of Judgment,
where Kant presents his aesthetic theory, judgment is defined as “the faculty for thinking
of the particular as contained under the universal”, which seems to limit judgment to
thoughts like ‘All men are mortal’ and ‘This swan is white,’ which bring particulars
under “universals”, or concepts, “which can be common to several things” (5:179;
A320/B377).
But Kant has a broader conception of judgment. Indeed, one of the central ideas in
the third Critique is that a judgment can be made without applying concepts at all. Hence,
a ‘reflective judgment’ is one in which “only the particular is given, for which the
universal is to be found” (5:179). For Kant, aesthetic judgment – ‘X is beautiful’ – is an

23
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instance of reflective judgment.24 Unlike ordinary cognitive judgments, aesthetic
judgments use “as a predicate something that is not even cognition at all, namely the
feeling of pleasure” (5:288). Strictly speaking, then, aesthetic judgments do not apply any
predicate. Rather, they involve “a satisfaction that accompanies the representation of the
object and serves it instead of a predicate” (5:288). Moreover, Kant takes the mental state
underlying aesthetic judgments to involve the ‘free play’ of our imagination, in which
that faculty synthesizes a particular representation in a pleasing way without being
governed by concepts of the understanding. So, for Kant, aesthetic judgments are
essentially non-conceptual in a certain sense; they are, as he repeatedly insists in his
official “definition[s] of the beautiful,” “without a concept” (5:219; 5:240).25
Though aesthetic judgments are non-conceptual and depend upon a subjective
feeling of pleasure, those judgments are more than brute feelings, according to Kant.
Crucially, aesthetic judgments involve a claim to universal validity, or normativity. An
aesthetic judgment, Kant tells us, “ascribes assent to everyone, and whoever declares
something to be beautiful wishes that everyone should approve of the object in question
and similarly declare it to be beautiful” (5:237). So, in judging e.g. a sunset to be
beautiful, I am claiming that everyone else ought to judge the same way that I do. Yet,
this claim to normativity does not depend on my recognition of the sunset as falling under
any concept of the understanding.26 For Kant, then, aesthetic judgments occupy a middle

24

Another is the activity of empirical concept formation (5:179-80).
To be clear, I only mean for the activity of aesthetic judgment to be non-conceptual in the sense that it
takes place independently of the subsumption of some given empirical object under an empirical concept.
That is, I want to remain agnostic with regards to the possibility that aesthetic judgments depend upon the
categories, or the pure concepts of the understanding. For a sophisticated reading on which the categories
do not function as concepts but only as logical functions in merely reflective judgment, see Béatrice
Longuenesse (1998), especially chapter 9.
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How such a judgment can legitimately make a claim to universality without being based on any
determinate concept is a problem to which Kant devotes a large portion of his aesthetic theory. That issue is
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ground between ordinary cognition, which derives its normativity from concepts, and
brute feeling, which is non-conceptual but lacks normativity.
However, any such interpretation of Kant’s account of aesthetic judgment faces
the following challenge. In the General Remark following his explication of aesthetic
judgments, Kant describes the ‘free play’ of the imagination as a “free lawfulness,” or
“lawfulness without a law” (5:240-1). In agreement with the account that has thus far
been outlined, these ostensibly paradoxical locutions seem to imply that the imagination
can be normatively governed without the concepts of the understanding. But Kant goes
on to qualify this implication: “Yet for the imagination to be free and yet lawful by
itself, i.e., that it carry autonomy with it, is a contradiction. The understanding alone
gives the law” (5:241). So, the imagination itself cannot be a source of normativity; the
understanding is needed for legislation. Problematically, then, this qualification suggests
that aesthetic judgments are, in fact, conceptual, for the reason that the normativity of
those judgments – indeed, all judgments – depends on the understanding, which Kant
labels “the faculty of concepts” (A126).
Hannah Ginsborg presents a helpful way of meeting this challenge. On her
interpretation, though the lawfulness of the imagination requires the understanding, we
need not take that faculty to be governed by any determinate concept. Rather, we need
only take the imagination as standing in a free or indeterminate relationship to the
understanding. She points out that, for Kant, this relationship serves as a condition for
judgment in general. In the unpublished Introduction of the Critique of Judgment, Kant
writes, “in a merely reflecting judgment imagination and understanding are considered in

most explicitly taken up in his ‘Deduction of pure aesthetic judgments’ (§§30-38). For the purposes of this
paper, I will set aside issues concerning the details and plausibility of that argument.
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the relation to each other in which they must stand in the power of judgment in general”
(20:220). Ginsborg states that condition as follows: “The possibility of judgment in
general requires that I be able to take my imaginative activity as exemplifying how it
ought to be with respect to the object given to me.”27 If we grant that pure aesthetic
judgments28 can make a legitimate claim to normativity29, then we can take those
judgments to satisfy this condition for judgment in general without being based on any
determinate concept. For, in that case, we grant that the activity of the imagination can
operate as it ought to without presupposing any concepts, or rules that determine how it
ought to synthesize a manifold of intuitions. That is to say, we can take aesthetic
judgments to involve what Ginsborg calls ‘primitive normativity’: “normativity which
does not depend on conformity to an antecedently recognized rule.”30
In addition to showing how the normativity of aesthetic judgments can involve the
understanding without being based on any determinate concept, Ginsborg applies the
notion of primitive normativity to a wide range of issues: meaning, rule-following, and
the formation of empirical concepts. With that said, in order to address McDowell’s
claim that the sole source of the normativity of intentional actions is concepts, or
determinate rules, we must consider the implications that primitive normativity has for
our understanding of agency. However, it is not immediately clear that there are any such
implications, given Ginsborg’s construal of primitive normativity as an awareness of
appropriateness that does not carry with it the idea of being guided by that awareness or
27

Ginsborg (1997b: 73).
Kant distinguishes between pure and impure aesthetic judgments (§§13-16). The former are not based on
any determinate concept or interest, whereas the latter are based on some concept or interest. An example
of an impure aesthetic judgment might be to judge a particular flower to beautiful based on what a flower is
supposed to be. For the purposes of my discussion, I focus specifically on pure aesthetic judgments.
29
See fn. 26.
30
Ginsborg (2011a: 232).
28
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any mental state.31 For Ginsborg, that distinctive form of awareness is a mere
accompaniment of, say, some meaningful expression. Yet, even if it can rightly be said
that the meaningful use of some expression is not a matter of being guided in that usage,
the same cannot be said of acting intentionally. For, unlike mere happenings, intentional
actions are normatively governed – there must be something that guides those actions.
So, an awareness of primitive normativity, when understood as nothing more than an
accompaniment of behavior, is insufficient for distinguishing mere happenings from
intentional actions. If that is the case, however, the notion of primitive normativity cannot
address McDowell’s claim about intentional action.
To illustrate this point, take some involuntary behavior: say, the grunts made by a
weightlifter.32 Let’s assume that the grunts made by a weightlifter, Arnold, assist him in
his activity, regardless of whether or not he takes those sounds to be doing so. That is to
say, Arnold’s grunts are not guided or in any way effected by his awareness of their
appropriateness33, if, indeed, he is so aware. Suppose, then, that Arnold is aware of the
appropriateness of his grunts. As he goes through the phases of the clean and jerk with a
record lift on the line, producing a booming grunt, Arnold is aware of the felicitousness
of his grunting. This case provides a parallel to Ginsborg’s construal of primitive
normativity: an automatic response that involves an awareness of the appropriateness of

31

This commitment is evidenced by her endorsement of Barry Stroud’s defense of the slogan that ‘meaning
is use’: “[Stroud] shows, to my mind convincingly, the error in a particular, but very widespread, version of
the “disastrous assumption,” namely that meaning or understanding something by an expression is a matter
of being instructed, guided, or justified in the use of that expression,” (2011b: 148).
32
Ginsborg notes this as one example among others of meaningless noises. The others are humming in jazz
piano improvisation and shouting in martial arts. “In these cases,” she says, “making, and perhaps also
hearing, certain sounds facilitates certain bodily movements, but in a way which is independent of whether
or not they mean anything to the person whose behavior is influenced by them,” (2011b: 167n15).
33
All that is meant by appropriateness here is that Arnold’s grunting is felicitous towards achieving his end
in weightlifting. Moreover, this sense of appropriateness is ‘thin,’ which is to say that it does not carry with
it any notion of responsibility.
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that response, where that awareness is a mere accompaniment to the response. Surely,
however, Arnold’s grunting is nothing more than a brute behavior, not an expression of
agency. This illustration shows, then, that an awareness of primitive normativity, as
described by Ginsborg, is not enough for establishing any recognizable sense of agency,
for the reason that that awareness fails to distinguish mere brute behavior, like Arnold’s
grunting, from intentional action.
If the notion of primitive normativity is going to establish (pace McDowell) the
possibility of non-conceptual agency, then that distinctive sort of normativity must be
understood in a way that allows for it to be capable of governing action. This would mean
that, in Arnold’s case, he would produce his grunts because of his awareness of their
appropriateness, where that awareness is independent of the application of any concept. I
think that Kant’s theory of artistic creativity provides the resources for explaining how
aesthetic judgment can govern action independently of any concept, or determinate rule.
That theory, in turn, is a suitable place to find Kant’s notion of second nature, or so I
hope to show in the fourth section of this paper.
3.2
A large part of Kant’s theory of artistic creativity concerns an apparent tension in
the notion of ‘fine art’. We have already seen that, for Kant, pure aesthetic judgments
cannot be based on concepts, or determinate rules. Hence, fine, or beautiful34, art must
seem to us as if its production were not based on any rule, according to Kant. As he puts
it, “beautiful art must be regarded as nature,” where that means fine art pleases us
“without showing any sign that the rule has hovered before the eyes of the artist and

34

Throughout his discussion of art, Kant uses the adjective ‘schön,’ which can be translated into English as
either ‘fine’ or ‘beautiful.’ I use the two translations interchangeably in this paper.
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fettered his mental powers” (5:307). At the same time, however, judged as the products
of human intention and skill, Kant thinks that we must take fine art to involve a rule
(5:306-7). So, fine art must be regarded as both natural and artificial – as something
spontaneous and as the product of rule-governed activity. Kant’s problem, then, is this:
how is fine art possible?35
The solution, for Kant, lies in the notion of ‘genius,’ which he first introduces in
§46 of his Critique of Judgment, ‘Beautiful art is the art of genius’. There, he appears to
give two definitions of genius: first, “Genius is the talent (natural gift) that gives the rule
to art”; and second, “Genius is the inborn predisposition of the mind (ingenium) through
which nature gives the rule to art” (ibid.). These definitions already suggest how it is that
genius is thought capable of reconciling the two seemingly contradictory characteristics
of fine art, since each definition emphasizes in its own way that the rule of art must be
given by nature through the faculties of a genius. This is made more explicit by the
conclusion of the argument that Kant goes on to make: “[the] nature in the subject (and
by means of the disposition of its faculties) must give the rule to art” (5:307).36 I will now
go on to show how it is, for Kant, that we can make sense of judging art to be fine, i.e., to
regard it as both natural and artificial, through regarding it is as the product of genius.

35

This is a problem for any theory of artistic creativity. The difference, however, is that, in Kant’s theory,
this problem is bound up with the central tension of aesthetic judgment in general: how can an aesthetic
judgment be both normative and non-conceptual? For Kant, the problem concerning the possibility of fine
art is looking at that same tension, though from the practical perspective of artistic creativity, rather than
the perspective of aesthetic appreciation. This is why it may seem promising to look at Kant’s theory of
artistic creativity to find resources for developing an account of non-conceptual agency: agency requires
normativity, and yet, if it is artistic creativity, it cannot be rule-governed in the normal way. I have
Professor Bristow to thank for clarifying this point with me.
36
A premise of the argument for this conclusion states that, in producing fine art, a genius cannot be guided
by any rule. However, one might worry that Kant is not justified in this claim, for the reason that it is
possible that an artist might simply be skilled at disguising the rule constraining their activity. Henry
Allison responds to this worry in his (2001: 280-1)
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In §46, Kant elucidates the essential characteristics of genius as it was just
defined. One essential feature of genius, indeed its “primary characteristic”, is originality,
which means that a genius must produce something that is not imitative and for which no
determinate rule can be given (5:308). For instance, Kant tells us that “no Homer or
Wieland can indicate how his ideas, which are fantastic and yet at the same time rich in
thought, arise and come together, because he himself does not know it and thus cannot
teach it to anyone else” (5:309). In this respect, Kant thinks that artistic creation is
different from scientific or mathematic discovery (ibid.). To preclude, however, the
possibility that genius can give rise to original nonsense, like the sounds produced by a
cat walking over the keys of a piano, Kant adds that another essential characteristic of
genius is that its products must be exemplary; that is, the products of genius must be able
to serve as models, or rules for judging for other artists. This allows a genius to give rise
to a school of art, as in the case of the old masters and their followers. So, rather than
following any antecedent, determinate rule in producing fine art, a genius creates an
indeterminate rule for other artists (including themselves) to follow.
But what, precisely, is that rule, and in what sense is it indeterminate? Moreover,
if the activity of genius is to serve as an example of non-conceptual agency, then that
indeterminate rule must normatively govern that activity. But how can that be the case,
given that such a rule is the product of that very activity? 37 To address these questions,
and thus establish the possibility of non-conceptual agency, we must turn to Kant’s
37

To be clear, I am not assuming that Kant needs an account of non-rule-governed agency. However, that
assumption might be inferred from Kant’s suggestive remarks about the possibility of purposiveness
without a purpose, or normativity without any determinate concept: “An object or a state of mind or even
an action, however, even if its possibility does not necessarily presuppose the representation of an end, is
called purposive merely because its possibility can only be explained and conceived by us insofar as we
assume as its ground a causality in accordance with ends, i.e., a will that has arranged it so in accordance
with the representation of a certain will” (5:220, emphasis added).
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notion of ‘aesthetic ideas’, for, as will be shown, those ideas are to be identified with the
indeterminate rule that normatively governs, and is the result of, the activity of genius.
Kant defines an aesthetic idea in §49, ‘On the faculties of the mind that constitute
genius’, as “that representation of the imagination that occasions much thinking without
it being possible for any determinate thought, i.e., concept, to be adequate to it” (5:314).
This definition tells us that aesthetic ideas are a kind of ‘intuition’, in Kant’s technical
usage of that term: they are singular representations normally given through sensory
experience. Unlike concepts, aesthetic ideas do not correspond to any type, which an
indefinite number of possible objects can instantiate or exemplify (A320/B377). Works
of art cannot be examples of aesthetic ideas; they can only express them. For that reason,
Kant only writes of the expression of aesthetic ideas, and never of anything, works of art
or otherwise, as being subsumed under them.
This first definition38 in §49 also identifies a positive and a negative aspect of
aesthetic ideas, the positive aspect being that those ideas are intuitions that ‘occasion
much thinking,’ and the negative one being that no determinate concept is adequate to
such representations. To be clear, the negative aspect is not that this unique sort of
intuition cannot be subsumed under any concept. For, to call them aesthetic ideas is to
already bring them under a concept, namely, the concept of ‘aesthetic ideas.’ A better
way of understanding the negative aspect of Kant’s definition is to see aesthetic ideas as
inexhaustible: it is not that we cannot say anything about aesthetic ideas, or the works of
art that express them, but that, in principle, we cannot say everything about them. It is
38

Kant gives a second definition later in §49: “In a word, the aesthetic idea is a representation of the
imagination, associated with a given concept, which is combined with such a manifold of partial
representations in the free use of the imagination that no expression designating a determinate concept can
be found for it, which therefore allows the addition to a concept of much that is unnameable, the feeling of
which animates the cognitive faculties and combines spirit with the mere letter of language” (5:316).
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important that aesthetic ideas be inexhaustible in principle, since, presumably, other
singular representations are inexhaustible in a certain sense, as well. For instance, it
seems as though I can make an infinite number of judgments about the book in front of
me, e.g., ‘it is in front of me’, ‘it is in this room’, ‘it is in this city’, etc. Each of these
judgments, however, would involve the subsumption of intuitions under concepts, but the
expression of aesthetic ideas, or aesthetic experience, is not like that, according to Kant.
There is always more to say e.g. about the ceiling of the Sistine Chapel in that viewing it
as a work of fine art stimulates our mental faculties in a way that does not come to any
end in a determinate statement about what that work of art means or expresses.
Genius manifests itself in the expression of aesthetic ideas, according to Kant.
For, corresponding to the originality of that activity, aesthetic ideas are said to be
inexhaustible; and, corresponding to its exemplarity, aesthetic ideas make an artist’s
intent communicable to other artists (including themselves) by way of the unity or
coherence of those sensible representations, which distinguishes them from ‘original
nonsense’.39 Hence, in ‘The Dialectic of Aesthetic Judgment’, Kant says that, “one can
also explain genius in terms of the faculty of aesthetic ideas” and, “beautiful
art…acquires its rule through aesthetic ideas” (5:344; 5:350-1). Furthermore, Kant
identifies the expression of aesthetic ideas with aesthetic judgment, or the ‘free play’ of
the imagination underlying that activity: “Beauty…can in general be called the

39

For more on this point about the unity or coherence of aesthetic ideas, see Henry Allison (2001: 288-9).
According to Allison, an aesthetic idea is a unity of partial representations, which Kant calls ‘aesthetic
attributes’. At one point, Allison writes, “it is precisely this coherence that distinguishes the exemplary
product of genius from “original nonsense,” and it is by bringing this unity to the products of the
imagination that the genius both brings the latter into harmony with his or her own understanding and
makes it communicable to others.”
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expression of aesthetic ideas” (5:320).40 Put another way, the expression of aesthetic
ideas involves an awareness of primitive normativity. So, we can make begin to sense of
how such awareness, or aesthetic judgment, can guide intentional actions, and therefore
establish the possibility of non-conceptual agency, by figuring out how an aesthetic idea
guides a genius in producing fine art.
Consider, then, that, even though aesthetic ideas are intuitions, Kant calls them
‘ideas’ “because they at least strive toward something lying beyond the bounds of
experience, and thus seek to approximate a presentation of concepts of reason (of
intellectual ideas), which gives them the appearance of an objective reality” (5:314). That
is to say, through aesthetic ideas, an artist can be understood as seeking to create
something that gives sensible representation to an idea of reason, which refers to
something beyond sensible experience, e.g., freedom, God, or immortality (ibid.).41 For
Kant, the unity or coherence of an aesthetic idea is established through its connection
with some idea of reason.42 For instance, what makes Michelangelo’s fresco on the
ceiling of the Sistine Chapel exemplary, and therefore capable of serving as a rule for
himself and other artists, is that it is capable of giving expression to aesthetic ideas that
give sensible representation to ideas of divine creation, sin, and salvation amongst others.

40

I take Kant to be making this identification earlier on at 5:314 and 5:316. Many commentators have taken
the apparently expressionist approach that Kant takes in his discussion of fine art to be in conflict with the
formalist approach to beauty that he takes in the prior sections of his Critique of Judgment, specifically the
‘Analytic of the Beautiful.’ I do not take up this issue in this paper, though I am sympathetic with Allison’s
(2001: 288-9) attempt to reconcile these approaches.
41
Among these sorts of ideas, Kant includes “ideas of invisible beings, the realm of the blessed, the realm
of hell, eternity, creation…death, envy, and all the other vices, as well as love, fame, and so on” (5:314).
These examples suggest that, for Kant, ideas of reason can be either moral (e.g., virtues and vices) or nonmoral (e.g., invisible beings, eternity, and creation).
42
At 5:326, Kant makes the stronger claim that fine art must be connected with moral ideas. However, it is
not entirely clear how e.g. a poem that expresses a cosmopolitan attitude is supposed to be connected to any
moral idea, or even why that must that connection must be made. I take it that Kant tries to explain how this
connection is possible in §59, where he defends his claim that “the beautiful is the symbol of the morally
good” (5:353). I do not take up the issues surrounding this symbolic relation in this paper.
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Thus, in spite of the originality of his work – that is, in spite of the presumed fact that
Michelangelo could not state exactly what he wanted to express in his painting – his
actions are nonetheless intelligible to others (including himself) in retrospect in virtue of
the aesthetic ideas expressed by his painting. In other words, it is only through looking
back on his activity with the indeterminate rule, i.e., aesthetic idea, it expresses in mind,
that we can regard Michelangelo’s product as fine art, i.e., regard his actions as
normatively governed independently any determinate concept.
Setting aside some difficult passages that I will address in the next section, the
above analysis of Kant’s theory of artistic creativity shows how artistic production serves
as an example of non-conceptual agency.43 For Kant, the activity of genius makes fine art
seem both spontaneous and rule-guided because that activity itself is both spontaneous
and rule-guided. However, the rule that is relevant here is neither an antecedent nor a
determinate representation. Rather, the rule that guides the activity of a genius is one that
the genius creates through that very activity, and that rule is indeterminate in the sense
that it is inexhaustible, or incapable of being fully articulated in terms of concepts. That
rule is a non-conceptual sensible representation, i.e., an aesthetic idea, the expression of
which involves an awareness of primitive normativity, or aesthetic judgment. So, in
giving expression to an aesthetic idea, Michelangelo can, in retrospect be understood as
being aware of the appropriateness of his choices, where that awareness made no explicit
reference to any concept, or any determinate rule of what a work of fine art ought to look
like. That distinctive sort of awareness guided the old master in his daily routine, for,

43

This is not to say that genius involves no concepts whatsoever; the production of fine art certainly
requires the application of some technical rules or concepts (e.g., colors, brushes, composition, etc). The
point in calling this activity non-conceptual is simply that those concepts do not normatively govern that
activity.
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looking back, we can see that he moved his hand the way he did over the ceiling of the
Sistine Chapel because of the ideas of reason that are given sensible representation by the
aesthetic ideas expressed through his work.
So, just as ‘thoughts without content’ found a niche within Kant’s system through
his necessary postulates of practical reason44, so do ‘intuitions without concepts’ through
his notion of aesthetic ideas. More precisely, Kant’s theory of artistic creativity shows
how, for him at least, an artist’s activity can be guided by an aesthetic idea, an
indeterminate rule created by that very activity. Contrary to McDowell’s claim about
human action, then, movements of one’s limbs without concepts are not necessarily mere
happenings. Rather, such movements can be expressions of a distinctive kind of agency,
at least in the case of artistic production.45 Thus free from McDowell’s restrictive
conception of intentional action, I think that we can more effectively appreciate Kant’s
distinctive notion of second nature.

4. Kant’s notion of second nature
My aim in this section is to use the materials of the preceding analysis to explicate
Kant’s distinctive notion of second nature. More precisely, I discuss each of the key
features of McDowell’s notion of second nature, which I briefly outlined in section 2.2,
in the context of Kant’s theory of artistic creativity, which I look at in section 3.2. In
doing so, I hope to show how Kant’s conception of genius as the expression of aesthetic
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For Kant, thoughts about the reality of freedom, the existence of God, and the immortality of the soul lie
beyond the bounds of sensible experience. Hence, these are to be regarded as ‘thoughts without content.’
Nonetheless, in the Critique of Practical Reason, he claims that these ideas of reason are necessary
postulates of reason, thereby finding a place for them in his practical philosophy (5:122f).
45
In the next section, I hope to suggest how I think that this account of non-conceptual agency can be
broadened beyond the scope of artistic achievement.
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ideas offers a notion of second nature that is similar to, albeit importantly distinct from,
the one to which McDowell himself appeals.
4.1
Recall that one key feature of McDowell’s notion of second nature is that our
responsiveness to reasons in general becomes second nature to us through the result of
socialization into a human community. How, if at all, does Kant’s conception of genius
as the expression of aesthetic ideas capture this feature as it applies to human action?
Consider Kant’s two definitions of genius: (1) genius is a ‘natural gift’
(Naturegabe), a “talent…that itself belongs to nature”, and (2) genius is an “inborn
predisposition of the mind (ingenium) through which nature gives the rule to art” (5:307).
As earlier stated, it is crucial, for Kant, that genius be understood as natural in some
sense, since its product must be regarded as beautiful, “without showing any sign that the
rule has hovered before the eyes of the artist and fettered his mental powers” (5:307).
However, it is not as though works of art are produced by some natural mechanism that is
external to the artist. Rather, on Kant’s conception, “nature in the subject (and by means
of the disposition of its faculties) must give the rule to art” (5:307, emphasis added). In
this respect, then, Kant’s theory of artistic creativity is opposed to the theory prevalent in
ancient Greece, according to which artists worked under the influence of Muses, or
goddesses of inspiration. For Kant, fine art, or that which gives expression to aesthetic
ideas, is essentially the result of a natural process.
Additionally, just as McDowell sees practical wisdom as resulting from an
educative process, so too Kant recognizes the importance of academic training in the
cultivation of genius. Hence, he writes: “Genius can only provide rich material for
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products of art; its elaboration and form require a talent that has been academically
trained, in order to make a use of it that can stand up to the power of judgment” (5:310).
In other words, in order to produce a work that has the sort of unity or coherence required
for the expression of aesthetic ideas, as opposed to original nonsense, an artist must take
the time to acquire and practice the skills of her art. This process will more than likely
involve some combination of instruction from a teacher, close studies of other works of
art or forms in nature, scrutinizing over the materials to be used, and countless hours
spent by the artist in trying e.g. to find the appropriate word for her poem or to capture
the right lighting in her painting. Indeed, perhaps because fine art is possible only under
such exceptional, though natural, conditions, Kant says “the genius is a favorite of
nature, the likes of which one has to regard as only a rare phenomenon…” (5:318,
emphasis added).
4.2
However, calling the genius a ‘favorite of nature’ and a ‘rare phenomenon’ seems
to conflict with another feature of McDowell’s notion of second nature, namely that the
capacity to think and act in response to reasons is accessible to all human beings who
have had a decent upbringing. How could genius be something that is both rare and
essentially within reach of everyone with the proper education?
To address this question, I must unpack an ambiguity in Kant’s conception of
genius that is made explicit by Henry Allison. On the one hand, Kant offers a ‘thick’
conception of genius, which is “characterized as an ‘exemplary originality’ and that
includes understanding and, indeed, judgment, together with an inventive imagination as
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essential components.”46 That is to say, in the ‘thick’ conception, genius refers to an
extraordinary natural talent to give expression to aesthetic ideas that already includes the
faculty of taste and, so, an awareness of primitive normativity. This is the conception of
genius that Kant apparently has in mind when he says, in §46, that genius is sufficient for
the production of fine art and that the products of genius could not be original nonsense.
However, in the following passage from §50, Kant contrasts genius with taste and claims
that genius is capable of producing nonsense:
Now since it is in regard to [genius] that an art deserves to be called
inspired, but only in regard to [taste] it deserves to be called a beautiful
art…For all the richness of the [imagination] produces, in its lawless
freedom, nothing but nonsense…Taste, like the power of judgment in
general, is the discipline (or corrective) of genius, clipping its wings and
making it well behaved or polished. (5:319)
To resolve this apparent textual conflict, we should recognize that Kant has another, less
demanding sense of genius. Following Allison, this ‘thin’ conception of genius “seems to
be limited merely to an imaginative capacity, and therefore does not itself involve
understanding, judgment, or taste.”47 Genius in this less demanding sense is not an inborn
predisposition to create works of fine art. Rather, it produces fine art only when it is
properly cultivated by taste. Thus, whereas the ‘thick’ conception of genius already
includes the faculty of taste, in the ‘thin’ conception taste is something to be added or
forced upon that talent. Disambiguating these two senses of genius removes the tension
between these portions of the text. The ‘thick’, more demanding sense of genius
corresponds to its usage in §46, and the ‘thin’, less demanding sense corresponds to its
usage in §50.

46
47

Allison (2001: 300).
Ibid.
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Disambiguating the two conceptions of genius48 also allows us to see how the
activity of genius can be made accessible to beyond those individuals with extraordinary
talent. The ‘thin’ conception of genius shows that one does not need to have the same
talent as Michelangelo or any other of the old masters for one’s movements to be guided
by an indeterminate rule, along with an awareness of primitive normativity. An
apprentice of Michelangelo can give expression to aesthetic ideas, so long as their
imagination is disciplined by taste in accordance with the indeterminate rule expressed by
the work of the old master: “[a genius’s] example for other good minds gives rise to a
school…and for these [lesser artists] beautiful art is to that extent imitation, to which
nature gave the rule through a genius” (5:318, emphasis added). Hence, it is only under
the ‘thick’ conception that “genius is entirely opposed to the spirit of imitation” (5:308).
Fine art can be imitative, so long as ‘nature gave the rule through a genius’.49 And, so, the
possibility of second nature is not limited to just ‘a favorite of nature’, like Michelangelo.
Rather, artists in general can act intentionally without any guidance from a determinate
concept, and hence those individuals are also capable of acquiring a second nature.
Before moving on to the third feature given above, I should address a possible
worry. One might object that I am mistaken to regard the followers of great artists as
geniuses in the ‘thin’ sense. For, in that sense, a genius was said to be highly original but
apt to produce nonsense, but ‘lesser’ artists are, according to common sense, precisely the
opposite – they lack originality, but are skillful in applying rules. However, for Kant,
48

Though Kant himself never explicitly distinguishes between these two conceptions of genius, we can
easily make sense of how it is implicitly at work in his discussion of artistic creativity. In particular, we can
see his analysis in §46 as addressing the everyday usage of ‘genius’ and in §50 as referring to his technical
usage of that notion. In any case, the distinction is helpful for making sense how Kant can claim, on the one
hand, that genius is a necessary and sufficient for the possibility of fine art in some places, while, on the
other hand, rejecting that claim.
49
For more on Kant’s systematic classification of various kinds of copying and imitation, see Martin
Gammon (1997).
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lesser artists are properly understood as geniuses in the ‘thin’ sense. The lesser artists, he
says, will abstract a rule from the work of a great artist, “letting it serve them as a model
not for copying but for imitation” (5:309). From there, the aesthetic idea expressed by
the work will “arouse similar ideas in [the] apprentice if nature has equipped him with a
similar proportion of mental powers” (ibid.). So, the apprentice does not simply copy the
works of their master. Rather, assuming the imagination and taste of the apprentice are
adequately developed, the master’s work will inspire them to create their own variation of
it in another work of art. And, though these works will be imitative, they will still be
original, since the apprentice is using the aesthetic idea expressed by the old master’s
work, which, given its inexhaustibility, cannot be fully articulated in terms of concepts.
This imitation infringes on originality only if it becomes what Kant calls ‘aping,’ of
which one sort is copying50: “the student copies everything, even down to that which the
genius had to leave in, as a deformity…” (5:318).
In short, lesser artists can create original works of art that are exemplary once
they have adequately developed their talents. So, even though many artists are governed
by a rule given through the work of some great artist, the work of those artists still counts
as an exercise of intentional activity that is not governed by any determinate concept in
virtue of the inexhaustibility of the awareness of appropriateness of that rule. In this way,
the activity of genius, and therefore second nature, is made accessible to all artists who
posses a similar, thought not as great, proportion of mental powers to those of rare

50

Another sort of aping, according to Kant, is mannerism: “Mannerism is another sort of aping, namely
that of mere individuality (originality) in general, in order to distance oneself as far as possible from
imitators, yet without having the talent thereby to be exemplary at the same time” (5:318). Whereas
copying suffers from a deficiency of originality, mannerism suffers from an excess of originality. Unlike
imitation, both sorts of aping suffer from a lack of talent to produce exemplary works of art.
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geniuses, or nature’s favorites. Of course, proper education may not be enough for all
individuals to become artists capable of produces fine art and such activity.
This ‘thin’ sense of genius can also be used, perhaps, to broaden the scope of
genius beyond the domain of artistic creation so that it be applicable to craft, as well.
Consider similarities and difference between the production of a wristwatch and a fresco
depicting a Biblical scene. One difference will be that a watchmaker must be trying to
make an example of a particular concept – the concept of ‘wristwatch, or perhaps some
particular type of wristwatch. Moreover, it may be rational for the watchmaker to adhere
to this concept in the interest of, say, functionality. To a certain extent, then, that concept
normatively governs the activity of the watchmaker. But the general concept of
‘wristwatch’ does not determine the particular details of what the wristwatch must be
like, such as whether it should have Geneva stripes and which material to use for its face.
In choosing those details, the watchmaker is not necessarily governed by an antecedent
rule. Rather, that activity may be governed by an awareness of the primitive normativity
associated with the rule that the watchmaker creates through that very activity. Unlike an
aesthetic judgment, however, which does not give rise to any cognition but merely the
quickening of our faculties, the watchmaker’s activity will produce a determinate rule, or
a concept to be used for the purposes of cognition. Still, perhaps the watchmaker’s
activity can count as an instance of non-conceptual agency, for the reason that that
activity is normatively governed by a rule, or concept, that does not precede its
completion.
I think that it is doubtful that Kant would be willing to expand the unique sort of
agency involved in artistic creativity to craft, or, for that matter, any activity outside of
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the aesthetic domain.51 Still, even broadening the scope of genius to include the talents of
lesser artists shows that that sort of agency is accessible to more than just those with
extraordinary talents. Furthermore, even McDowell imposes limitations on the
accessibility of second nature in his usage of that notion by stating that only those people
with proper training will acquire second nature.
4.3
A third feature of McDowell’s notion of second nature, recall, is that the
development of our responsiveness to reasons as second nature is constrained by aspects
of ourselves as mere animals, i.e., our first nature. I think that the way in which Kant’s
conception of genius embraces this feature is more straightforward than the previous one.
First of all, Kant would presumably agree that aesthetic judgments are conditioned by the
constitution of our sensible faculties, given that those judgments make claims to
universality based on a feeling of pleasure. Second, consider the Kant’s following
characterization of the process underlying the expression of aesthetic ideas: “The
imagination (as a productive cognitive faculty) is, namely, very powerful in creating, as it
were, another nature, out of the material which the real one gives it” (5:314, emphasis
added). So, for example, in painting the ceiling of the Sistine Chapel, Michelangelo was
constrained by the chemical composition of the pigment he applied to the plaster as well
as the wetness of the plaster itself. Had he used pigment from another location or waited
several hours more before applying the pigment to the plaster, his work would have come
out differently, if at all. More generally, we can say that, for Kant, the organization of
some natural material in an aesthetically pleasing way, i.e., the transformation of that
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Kant distinguishes art from nature, skill, and craft in §43 of the Critique of Judgment.
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material into second nature, is at least partially determined by the contingencies of that
material itself.
4.4
To see how Kant’s conception of genius, like McDowell’s notion of second
nature, involves a ‘partial re-enchantment’ of nature, consider this passage, which
provides a fuller context for the quote mentioned above from 5:314:
We entertain ourselves with it when experience seems too mundane to us;
we transform the latter, no doubt always in accordance with analogous
laws, but also in accordance with principles that lie higher in reason (and
which are every bit as natural to us as those in accordance with which the
understanding apprehends empirical nature); in this we feel our freedom
from the law of association (which applies to the empirical use of that
faculty), in accordance with which material can certainly be lent to us by
nature, but the latter can be transformed by us into something entirely
different, namely into that which steps beyond nature. (ibid., emphasis
added)
In other words, the expression of aesthetic ideas is like second nature in that it requires
that the imagination take the material provided to it by first nature, e.g., perceptual
experience, and infuse it with normativity, or meaning. Aesthetic ideas are nonetheless
natural for Kant, since their expression is in accordance with principles of reason ‘which
are every bit as natural to us as those in accordance with which the understanding
apprehends empirical nature’. That the expression of aesthetic ideas involves, for Kant,
the infusion of normativity is made clear by not only this statement about the principles
underlying the expression of aesthetic ideas as belonging to reason but also what was said
earlier about the relationship between those ideas and aesthetic judgments. Beauty, for
Kant, just is the expression of aesthetic ideas. Hence, the latter carries with it precisely
same sort of normativity involved in the former, though Kant’s notion of aesthetic ideas
makes it more apparent how that normativity is supposed to integrated with nature.
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4.5
Lastly, according to McDowell’s notion of second nature, our capacity to think
about and act in the world in response to reasons is cognitive; that is, the exercise of that
capacity engenders empirical knowledge through the subsumption of intuitions under
concepts. I take his feature of second nature to be crucial for McDowell, since he takes it
to guarantee that a notion of second nature will suffice to preserve the Kantian insight
that empirical knowledge requires the integration of concepts and intuitions. That is to
say, if the notion of second nature, for whatever reason, failed to make empirical
knowledge possible, then, for McDowell, it would be useless with respect to exorcising
the philosophical anxiety concerning the possibility of normatively governed thought and
action for natural beings such as ourselves. However, even if, as I have been suggesting,
Kant does employ a notion of second nature in his theory of artistic creativity, it seems as
though that notion plays no role in making empirical knowledge possible. For Kant
insists that an essential feature of aesthetic judgments is that they do not give rise to
cognition – that, although aesthetic judgments involve claims to universality, those
claims have merely subjective validity.52 Perhaps for this reason, then, we should accept
McDowell’s claim that Kant lacks a ‘serious’ notion of second nature. Consequently,
though Kant’s theory of artistic creativity contains many of the relevant features of
McDowell’s notion of second nature, that theory abandons the one that is the most
essential.
But I think that Kant did regard his aesthetic theory as closely related to his
insight about the nature of objectively valid cognition. Recall that, on Ginsborg’s
interpretation, though aesthetic judgment, or the expression of aesthetic ideas, does not
52

See, in particular, §33 of the Critique of Judgment.
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involve the subsumption of intuitions under concepts, that sort of judgment does require
that the imagination stand in a certain relationship to the understanding. That relationship,
for Kant, is one that “[those faculties] must stand in the power of judgment in general”
(20:220). That is to say, aesthetic judgment, and hence the expression of aesthetic ideas,
exemplifies a relationship that serves as a precondition for the possibility of objectively
valid cognition.53 In this way, although the exercise of second nature through aesthetic
judgment does not result in empirical knowledge, for Kant, it is nonetheless indispensable
for the possibility of that sort of knowledge or cognition in general.
In addition, Kant thinks that works of arts serve a cognitive function with respect
to ideas of reason. Such ideas contain a “concept (of the supersensible) for which no
suitable intuition can ever be given” (5:342). The ideas of freedom, God, immortality,
heaven, hell, and infinity amongst others can never, according to Kant, be given direct
sensible expression. Since these ideas can never be adequately given sensible expression
via intuitions, and intuitions are necessary for cognition, we can never cognize these
ideas. However, through their works of art, and therefore the expression of aesthetic
ideas, Kant thinks that artists strive to give sensible expression to ideas of reason (5:314).
Moreover, in defense of his famous claim that beauty symbolizes the morally good, Kant
points out various similarities between aesthetic and moral judgments (5:353-4). In virtue
of these similarities, he thinks that the distinctive pleasure derived from beautiful objects
“makes possible the transition from sensible charm to the habitual moral interest without
too violent a leap” (5:354). Although these remarks about the relationship between art
53

Another crucial passage on this point about the relationship between the mental state underlying aesthetic
judgments and cognition comes in §9, where Kant identifies the free, harmonious play of the faculties
underlying aesthetic judgments with that “state of mind that is encountered in the relation of the powers of
representation to each other insofar as they relate to a given representation to cognition in general”
(5:217).
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and ideas of reason, beauty and morality, require closer attention, they make it clear that
Kant regards beauty, or the expression of aesthetic ideas, as serving an important role in
the bringing ideas of reason closer to cognition through the feeling of pleasure involved
in aesthetic judgment.

5. Conclusion
For a couple of reasons, I do not take the preceding sections to conclusively show
that Kant does in fact possess and employ a notion of second nature that would satisfy
McDowell. The first reason concerns his careful, though unexplained, qualification that
Kant lacks lacks a pregnant or serious notion of second nature. Even if the similarities
between Kant’s theory of artistic creativity and McDowell’s naturalism are real, it is not
clear that those similarities would suffice for attributing a notion of second nature to
Kant. Without a clearer understanding of what is needed for a serious notion of second
nature, it remains open to McDowell or someone else to insist that Kant lacks the
necessary resources. Then again, absent a more explicit statement of what constitutes
second nature, I also think that the similarities are strong enough to provide some reason
for doubting McDowell’s criticism against Kant. That criticism relies on assumptions that
neglect the broader resources and aims of Kant’s aesthetic theory, assumptions that I
hope to have shown to be mistaken in light of that theory.
However, a second obstacle in the way of legitimately attributing a notion of
second nature to Kant concerns not the content of such a notion but its role, particularly
in McDowell’s project. In highlighting the striking similarities between Kant’s theory of
artistic creativity and McDowell’s naturalism, I have also tried to spell out the differences
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between the two. One of those differences is that, for Kant, aesthetic judgments do not
give rise to cognition, but, for McDowell, the exercise of second nature must engender
empirical knowledge. Another difference, which I did not make explicit, is that
McDowell holds that second nature alerts us to rational demands in general, whereas
Kant holds that second nature, assuming he employs such a notion, makes us responsive
to specifically aesthetic demands. These are just two ways in which Kant’s notion of
second nature may, by McDowell’s lights at least, fail to be of any use.
Related to this obstacle is that, from McDowell’s perspective, a notion of second
nature is useful only if that notion is wholly naturalized. However, nothing I have said
here has shown that Kant has abandoned the supernaturalistic view suggested by his
doctrine of transcendental idealism. So, even if Kant does possess a notion of second
nature, his transcendental framework will spoil that notion, at least in the eyes of
McDowell. Of course, this assumes that what McDowell wants from a notion of second
nature is achievable, or even something worth desiring. It may turn out that a notion of
second nature can be useful in respects other than the ones sought after by McDowell.
Perhaps, for instance, Kant’s distinctive notion of second nature can serve to lessen the
aversion that McDowell and others have towards rampant platonism by showing how,
even within such a supernaturalistic view, nature can be understood as more than merely
mechanical, particularly within the domain of artistic creativity. Or, in addition maybe,
Kant’s notion of second nature shows that we cannot, as McDowell tries to do, eliminate
the apparent opposition between the normative and the natural. Rather, that notion can, at
best, perhaps allows us to throw “throw a bridge from one domain to the other”, merely
making the seeming gap between the normative and the natural less troublesome (5:195).
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